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IN THE SUP.REME COURT 
of the 
STATE OF UTAH 
CECIL R. MARTIN 
Plaintiff and Respondent, 
vs. No. 9565 
CARL EHLERS, 
Defendant and Appellant. 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT 
STATEMENT OF T·HE KIND OF CASE 
This is an action to recover for personal injuries 
and property damage arising out of an intersection 
collision betw~en the plaintiff driving his automobile 
and the defendant driving an emergency police vehicle. 
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT 
The case was tried to a jury. From a verdict and 
judgment for plaintiff, defendant appeals. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Defendant seeks reversal of the verdict and for 
judgment in his favor as a matter of law, or in . the 
alternative, a new trial. 
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STATEl\fENT OF FACTS 
Gene~rally SJ)eak:ing, tl;le facts set forth in the ap~ 
pellant's brief are correct, but in. reviewing the evidence 
the Court must consider the eviderrce in the light most 
favorable to the· plaintiff's case inasmuch as the judg~ 
rnent was in favor of the plaintiff. The plaintiff will, 
therefore, set out a few exceptions to appellant's state-
ment of facts and some additional facts which plaintiff 
contends support the judgment and the jury's finding. 
On J nne 10, 1959, at about 5 :30 P.lYl., the plaintiff 
was eastbound on 27th South Street, Salt Lake City, 
Utah, and the defendant, driving in a sheriff's vehicle 
with a red light on and siren operating, was southbound 
on Seventh East Street. The red light was located on 
the right side of his car at the base of the windshield 
( Exh. P -4). There were two lines of vehicles occupying 
the west half of Seventh East Street north of 27th South 
Street extending some distance to the north of the inter-
section (R 110, 121, 150 & 157) and blo:cking the vision 
of each of the drivers. The defendant was traveling in 
the lane of traffic for northbound vehicles east of the 
two lines of vehicles, and as he neared the intersection 
he stated that he looked to the west but could only see 
a few fee't (R 182). The light was red for him as he 
approached the intersection (R 111, 120 & 140). The 
plaintiff, as he approached the intersection, looked to 
the left along Seventh East Street but did not see the 
police car approaching because of the stopped cars along 
Seventh East Street (R 142'). The station wagon of the 
witness, Tho1nas Fyans, was stopped at the crosswalk 
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,vvw 
..&f- the inside lane on the north side of Seventh East 
( R. 111) and the witness, Daniel Gehrke, in his vehicle 
waH stopped irmnediately behind the station wagon. The 
plaintiff was from 30 to 100 feet from the intersection 
when the light turned green for him (R 120 & 140). He 
was traveling at about 30 miles per hour as he ap-
proached the intersection. lie testified that he did not 
hear the siren and that until the light turned green for 
him there was traffic going across 27th South Street in 
a north-south direction (R 140). I-Ie saw the police car 
as soon as it came from behind the two lines of stopped 
cars and applied his brakes leaving brake marks before 
and up to the impact as follows : right front, 24 feet 
seven inches; right rear, 14 feet 5 inches; left front, 
2-:1: feet 9 inche1s; left rear 12 feet (Exh. P-1, R 82). The 
impact occurred 17 feet 10 inches east of the west line 
of the intersection and 24 feet 7 inches south of the north 
side of the intersection (Exh. P-1). The defendant stated 
that he slowed his vehicle as he approached the inter-
section hut admitted that he could have been going 40 
miles per hour at the time of impact (R 97 & 173). 
Officer Ehlers, the defendant, did not see the paintiff's 
vehicle at any time before impact (R 172). He stated 
that he saw no cars moving in the intersection and that 
there were cars on the east side of the intersection, hut 
he was unable to see whether they were in the lane's of 
traffic or over to the right (R 182.). The plaintiff said 
he saw a car or cars on the east side hut they could have 
been parked cars not in the lane of traffic (R 140). 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
4 
.Tl).e independe,nt witnesses, Thomas ,Fyans and 
Daniel Gehrke, did not see any vehicles stopped on the 
east side of the intersection although both of them were 
in excellent position to have seen them if the,re were any 
there (R 114,-151. & 163). Thomas Fyans testified that 
he he~rd the siren when the police car was 500 to 600 
feet away from the intersection (R 149) but while the 
light was green for east-west traffic on 27th South after 
he had heard the siren the traffic continued to flow along 
said 27th South and did not hesitate. 
"Q. ****. Had the cars on 27th South Street, 
going either east or west, stopped to allow the 
police 'Car to come through, did you notice~ 
A. Well, at that point- now you are talk-
ing at the time that the light just turned green 
to me~ 
Q~ Well, at any point you coUld tell us. 
A. That would have been controlled at the 
time it was red, the light was red, that the traffic 
of course was passing on 27th South. And at the 
time that it turned green, well, to answer your 
question specifically, I don't think anyone hesi-
tated on 27th South. I mean I think they were 
unable, of course, to - well, that would be a 
supposition. I didn't see any hesitation on 27th 
South. 
Q. As the police car neared the intersection 
did you notice any cars going either east or west 
stopped to let the police car go through~ 
A. Well, it see1ns to me at that time I was of 
course concerned what would happen. I could 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
5 
see the police car coming south, and I looked at 
the intersection and the intersection was clear." 
(R 151) 
The witness, Daniel Gehrke, testified that he did 
not hear the siren until the police ear was within three 
to four car lengths frmn his car (R 111 & 112) ; that the 
car was moving 30 to 40 miles per hour, and that the 
operator may have taken his foot off the gas, hut he 
didn't know whether he braked or not (R 113). Officer 
Ehlers testified he didn't know whether the siren was 
on low or high pitch as he arrived at the interse:etion 
(R 180) but he did state his vehiele was equipped with 
a stick shift and he shifted gears as he neared the inter-
section (R 173). The witness, Fyans, also te·stified that 
the police car was going 35 to 40 miles peT hour, that 
there was some hesitation of the ear as it passed him, 
and that the driver let his foot off the gas or touched 
the brake. He eould see some hesitation of the ear (R 
154). The front of the plaintiff's vehiele struek the right 
side of the police ear driven by the defendant. The 




THE EVIDENCE SUPPORT'S THE JURY'S FINDING 
THAT THE APPELLANT WAS GUIUTY OF NEGLIGENCE. 
The evidence is not in dispute that there were two 
lines of traffi'e stopped on the west side of Seventh East 
Street north of the intersection which equally blocked 
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the view of the drivers of both vehicles involved in the 
accident; that the light was green for plaintiff and red 
for the defendant, and that the defendant entered the 
intersection against the red light traveling at a spe·ed 
of 35 to 40 miles per hour from a position east of the 
two lines of stopped traffic. The defendant claims that 
he was not guilty of negligence and asserts· an exemption 
under Seetion 41-6-14, Utah Code Annotated, 1953, which 
provided as follows at the· time the accident occurred: 
Authorized emergen1CY vehicle shall be exempt from the 
driving restrictions imposed under sections 41-6-20 to 
and including 41-6-28, 41-6-46 to and including 41-6-82, 
and 41-6-91 to and including 41-6-106 when driven under 
the. following conditions: 
(1). Said exemption shall apply whenever any 
said vehicle is being driven in response to an emergency 
call or when used in the pursuit of an actual or suspected 
violator of law, or when responding to but not returning 
from a fire alarm. 
( 2). Said exemption herein granted to an. author-
ized emergency vehicle shall apply only when the driver 
of any said vehicle while in motion sounds audible signal 
by bell, siren or exhaust whistle as may be reasonably 
necessary, and when the vehicle is equipped with at least 
one lighted lamp displaying a red light visible under 
normal atmospher:Ic conditions from a distance of 500 
feet to the front of such vehicle. 
(b). The foregoing provisions shall not relieve 
the driver of an authorized emergency vehicle from the 
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duty to drive with due regard for the safety of all per-
sons, nor shall such provisions protect the driver from 
the consequences of an arbitrary e x e r c i s e of the· 
privileges declared in this section. 
rr'he appellant, driving at 35 to 40 miles per hour in 
a southerly direc.tion east of these two lines of traffic 
in the lane for northbotmd traffic on Seventh East 
Street, was traveling in total disregard of the rights of 
other motorists using the highways. At the speed he was 
traveling he had no hope of being able to s.ee between the 
two lines of stopped cars which he was passing to 
detern1ine whether or not there were cars corning fr01n 
the west, the direction in which his view was blocked. 
The distance from the front of the station wagon driven 
by the witness, Fyans, to the point of impact was only 
slightly in excess of 25 feet. Traveling 35 to 40 miles 
per hour defendant would have not more than about 
one-half seeond after emerging from the lines of cars 
within which to observe whether or not any vehicles were 
coming from the west and to take action to avoid an 
accident. Likewise, he knew or should have known that 
vehicles approaching from the west would not be able to 
see him in time to avoid an accident. 
The red spotlight on appellant's vehicle was at the 
base of the windshield on the right side of his car and 
would, therefore, not be visible to the plaintiff as he 
approached on 27th South Street. One of the warning 
devices to give other drivers notice of the approach of 
defendant's vehicle was, therefore, ineffective as far as 
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the plaintiff_ was. concerned because it could not readily 
be seen and.the defendant was well aware. of this fact or 
should have hee:p.. 
The evidence is clear that the light was red against 
the defendant as _he approached the intersectio:p., and no 
claim has been made by him that it was otherwise. It is 
only natural that traffic facing the red semaphore 
should he stopped. There. was. nothing, therefore, about 
the stopped traffic on the north and south side of the 
intersection to give the defendant any indication one 
way o:r another that his light had been seen by east-west 
traffic or his siren heard .. The defendant was unable 
actually to say whether ther~ were any cars on the east 
side of the intersection but could only say that nothing 
was moving (R 181 & 182). The fact that both the 
witnesses Fyans and Gep.rke sta:ted there were no cars 
stopped on the east side of the intersection is significant. 
The j11ry could easily have found that there were no:p.e. 
The appellant contends that all automobiles at the 
intersection either heard or observed the emergency 
vehicle approaching and yielded the right-of-way but the 
evidence does not show this to be so, because all north-
south traffic was stopped for the red light facing north-
south traffic and theTe is an actual dispute in the evi-
dence as to whether there was any traffic stopped on the 
east side of the intersection. The witness Fyans claimed 
he heard the siren and located the police vehicle when 
the police car was 500 to 600 feet away (R 149). The 
witness Gehrke, immediately behind Fyans, testified he 
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did not hear the siren until the vehicle was three to four 
car lengths behind him (R 111 & 112). Itis interesting 
to note that Fyans .also testified that the red light on 
the officers car was on top and that it was a flashing 
type red light, whereas the evidence is positive from the 
pictures of the car (Exh. P-4) that the light was at the 
base of the windshield. The officer and other witnesses 
testified also that it was a constant light. 
There is no evidence from any witness in a moving 
vehicle that any siren was heard and the plaintiff testi-
fied that he did not hear the siren. The fact that he was 
in a moving vehrcle would have some effect on his 
ability to hear the siren. The officer did not know 
whether the siren was on high or low pitch as he neared 
the intersection (R 180), and wasn't able to say which 
sound carried better, but certainly this would be a 
question for the jury to determine whether he was acting 
reasonably in activating the siren. 
The fact that traffic continued to flow normally 
along 27th South Street as the officer approached is 
some indication that the siren could not properly be 
he·ard. Certainly the plaintiff's opportunity to hear the 
siren was not as good as the witnesses who were stopped 
at the intersection, and the witness, Gehrke, did not hear 
the siren until the poli'ce car was right close to his car, 
even though his window was down. He states that he 
had his left arm out the window. The eiVidence clearly 
supports the jury's findings of negligence upon the part 
of the defendant both as to speed and lookout which 
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constitute failure upon the part of the defendant to 
drive with due regard for the safety of all persons. 
Appellant has cited several cases and particularly relies 
upon Lakoduk vs. Cruger, (Wash.) 296 P(2) 690 which 
case cites and quotes the California case of Lucas vs. 
City of Los Angeles (10 Cal(2) 475, 75 P.(2) 602) which 
holds that the expression in the Statute authorizing the 
exemptions granted to emergency vehicles "shall not 
relieve the driver of an authorized emergency vehicle 
from the: duty to drive with due regard for the safety of 
all persons", means that as long as he is sounding his 
siren and exhibiting a red light he has complied with the 
requirements of exercising due care for the safety of 
other motorists. This rule and the reasoning in this 
case was rejected in the case of Jensen vs. Taylor, 2 
Utah (2) 196, 271 P (2) 838, in which our court stated that 
to adopt the view oontended for by the defendant would 
ignore comp~etely the specific limitations placed by the 
legislature on the driver of an emergency vehicle. In 
the Jensen 'Case the trial court instructed the jury to 
determine if defendant used his privilege properly by 
reducing his speed as n1uch as may have been necessary 
for safe ope:ration of the fire truck and by driving with 
due regard for the safety of all persons. The Utah 
Appellate Court stated that the instruction was proper 
and that the question of negligence, contributory negli-
gence, and proximate cause was a jury question. 
At the time of the Jensen vs. Taylor case the Statute 
provided that an e1nergency vehicle may proceed past 
a red signal but shall slow down as necessary for safety 
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but may proceed cautiously past such red or stop sign 
or signal. This portion of the Statute was eliminated 
by the 1955 legislature but the requirement to exercise 
due regard for the safety of others was. not changed. 
In the case of Johnson vs. Maynard, 9 Utah(2) 268, 
~j--1:2 P ( 2) 884, the accident occurred on November 21, 
1955. The same s.tatutory provisions were in effect as 
were in effect at the time of the accident in the case now 
before this Court. There the defendant, a police offrcer, 
was on an emergency call to investigate a fatal accident 
that had just occurred and was traveling north on Wash-
ington Boulevard in Ogden. The plaintiff was approach-
ing Washington Boulevard going west on 27th Street 
with a green light in her favor. vVhen the defendant was 
about 350 feet south of the intersection he turned on his 
red signal light and stepped on his siren button. The 
siren died down while he was shifting into second to 
pick up speed. He said he was traveling just under 40 
miles per hour. Just as plaintiff passed the center of 
the intersection the defendant's car struck plaintiff's ca.r 
on the right side just behind the door post. In that case 
the Court said: 
"'The evidence unquestionably would sup-
port a finding of negligence against the de-
fendant even though he was responding to an 
emergency call and while operating his red signal 
light and siren was exempted from certain usual 
traffic rules, insofar as material here: from speed 
regulations and obeying traffic lights. But the 
statute also provides that this shall not relieve 
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the driver from the duty to drive with due regard 
for the safety of all persons under the circum-
stances.'' 
Our Court in the Jensen vs. Taylor and the Johnson v.s. 
Maynard cases, supra, has followed the same reasoning 
and reached the same results as several other states 
having statutes similar to Utah's. These states have 
expressly rejected the doctrine laid down by the Cali-
fornia and Washington cases cited by appellant. See the 
following: 
Md.: Mayor and City Counsel of Baltimore, et al. 
vs. Fire Insurance Salvage Corporat~on of Balti:more, 
et al, 1959, 219 ~1:d. 75, 148 A(2) 444. Wis.: Montalto 
vs. Fondulac County, 1956, 76 NW (2) 279. Ariz.: Ruth 
vs. Rhodes, 185 P(2) 304. l\1:e.: Ru.ssell v.s. Nadeau, 29 
A(2) 916. Texas: Grammier-Di·smukes Company vs. 
Peyton, 22 SW(2) 544. Minn.: Travis vs. Collett, 17 
NW(2) 68. 
In the l\1:ayor and City Counsel of Baltimore case, supra, 
which involved the interpretation of a statute similar to 
ours, the Court said: 
"We, therefore, hold that under a proper 
construction of Section 214, the provision that 
requires the op~rator of an authorized emergency 
vehicle to do so 'with due regard for the safety 
of all persons using the street' renders him liable 
for ordinary negligence, namely a failure to exer-
cise reasonable care and diligence under the cir-
cumstances. ******In holding that operators of 
authorized emergency vehicles are liable for 
ordinary negligence under the statutes mentioned, 
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. wti do. not, of course, mean to state that their 
conduct in the operation of such vehicles is mea-
sured by exactly the same yardstick as the actions 
of the operators of conventional vehicles. The 
urgency of their missions demands that they re-
spond to ~calls with celerity and as expeditiously 
as is reasonably possible. When giving audible 
signals, they are, within limitations, relieved from 
speed regulations, rules of· the road and certain 
other provisions. It is generally recognized that 
firemen when going to a fire often drive at a rate 
of speed that could not be justified by the ordin-
ary motorist. They are not required to stop for 
red lights <Yr other stop signals, but may slow 
down and proceed cautiously through them. How-
ever, they are bound to exercise reasonable pre-
cautions against the extraordinary dangers of 
the situation that the proper performance of their 
duties compels them to create. When dealing 
with the operation of emergency vehicles, it is 
particularly appropriate to recognize that negli-
gence and reasonable care are relative terms and 
their application depends upon the situation of 
the parties and the degree of care and vigilance 
which circumstances reasonably impose. N egli-
gence and reasonable care derive their only 
signifi'cance from a factual background, and that 
background must contain evidence of circum-
stances which justify a legitimate inference that 
in the exercise of reasonable care and prudence 
injury could have been avoided." 
POINT II 
THE PLAINTIFF, WAS NOT CONTRIBUTORILY NEG-
LIGENT AS A MATTER OF LAW. 
The plaintiff was approaching a signal-controlled 
intersection with the green light in his favor. Cross 
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traffic had stopped for the light on both the north and 
south sides of the interse·ction before he arrived and he 
had a right to rely on his right-of-way until something 
appeared to indicate it was not safe to do so. He was 
driving within the speed limit and was keeping a proper 
lookout along the highway ahead of him as is evidenced 
by the fact that he was able to apply his brakes and 
leave 24 feet of skid marks prior to impact (Exh. P-1, 
R 82). The plaintiff 'either saw the red light of the police 
vehicle or heard the siren just before reaching the west 
intersection line in order to react as he did to the danger. 
He stated he did not hear the siren or se,e the red light, 
but the physical facts would indicate that he may have 
done. The appellant contends that all others at the 
intersection heard the siren, but it is significant that 
the witness, Gehrke, only one car back from the inter-
section and on the side from which the police vehicle 
approached did not hear the siren until the police car 
was within three to four car lengths from him, and that 
the witness, Fyans, although he claimed to have heard 
the siren from a distance of 500 to 600 fe,et, testified that 
traffic along 27th South Street proceeded without hesita-
tion (R 151). The jury made a specific finding that 
plaintiff was not negligent in failing to heed the warning 
of the siren and red light of the Ehlers car and indicated 
that plaintiff was exercising due care in the operation 
of his vehicle and attention thereto (R 55 and 56). In 
the Johnson vs. lJfaynard case, supra, the Court said: 
'"A driver approaching a signal-controlled 
intersection with the light in her favor has the 
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right-of-way and can rely on it until something 
appears to indicate it is not safe to do so. It is, 
of cours,e, true that she cannot assume full pro-
tection by the traffic light and remain oblivious 
to cars approaching against it. But it is to be 
kept in mind that the management of an auto-
mobile in downtown traffi'c demands an aware-
ness of a number of things so that she cannot be 
giving her full attention to any particular hazard. 
She must he paying some attention to the actual 
operation of her car and also be aware of possible 
hazards from a number of directions; to the road 
ahead and any possible obstac.le·s therein, or pedes-
trians who may be in or approaching the cross-
walk to traffic which Inay be approaching from the 
east and/ or turning right or left in the inter-
section. It is because of these numerous hazards 
and to facilitate an orderly flow of traffic that 
traffic lights are installed. They permit the 
motorist to enter the interse:ction with some 
assurance of safety when the traffic light is in 
his favor. Being under the obligation to divide 
her attention to the numerous hazards just ad-
verted to, plus the assurance that she might 
reasonably take from the fact that the traffic 
light was presumably holding any traffic from 
entering the intersection from the south, the trial 
court correctly determined that reasonable minds 
might find that in entering the intersection, as 
plaintiff did, she was within the limits of due 
care under the circumstances and consequently 
the question of her contributory negligence was 
one of fact for the jury." 
We submit that the facts in the case now before this 
Court make out a much stronger case to go to the jury 
than did the facts in Johnson vs. Maynard case with 
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respect to the: question of contributory negligence and 
that the jury's finding in that regard was proper. 
POINT III 
THERE WAS NO ERROR IN THE COURT'S INSTRUC-
TIONS GIVEN TO THE JURY TH.NT WAS PREJUDICIAL 
TO THE DEFENDANT. 
The defendant complains that by the Court's instruc-
tion No. 16 the jury was instructed that both respondent 
and appellant were to be judged by the same standard 
of care. However, in its instructions No. 12, 13 and 14 
(R 44, 45, 46) the Court instructed the jury in the specific 
privileges and duties of the respective drivers under the 
applicable laws and gave to the jury the standard of 
care by which the operator of the police vehicle was to be 
judged. In instruction No. 9 (R 4i) the Court instructed 
the jury that they were to consider all the instructions 
as a whole and to· regard each in the light of all the 
others and not to single out any certain sentence or any 
individual point or instruction and ignore the others. 
There was, th~refore; nothing misleading· in the instruc-
tions to the jury. Instruction No. 16 and the special 
verdict was under the rest of the instructions considered 
by the jury subject to the background of instructions 
12, 13 and 14 given by the Court. 
CONCLUSION 
It is respectfully submitted that the evidence clearly 
supports the finding of the jury that the defendant was 
negligent; that the plaintiff was not contributorily negli-
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gent; that plaintiff was not guilty of contributory negli-
gence a.s a matter of law, and that there was no prejudice 
at all accorded to the defendant in the Court's instruc-
tions. The jury's verdict should, therefore, be upheld. 
Respectfully submitted. 
RICH & STRONG and 
LAWRENCE L. SUMME·RHAYS 
604 Boston Building 
Salt Lake City 11, Utah 
Attorneys for Respondent 
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